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A Check-in on Privacy After United States v.
Jones: Current Fourth Amendment
Jurisprudence in the Context of Location-
Based Applications and Services
by KATHRYN NOBUKO HORWATH*
My alarm clock goes off. Presumably on my iPhone 4,
because it's very important to me that I own the latest
technology. I hit snooze. I can't believe I have to get up
by 9 a.m. to make it to my place of work before 10 a.m.
where I am paid to be creative and knowledgeable
about "the internet," just in general.
I check Twitter.
I check Facebook.
I casually thumb through emails I've received since
going to bed....
I take a shower ....
I check Twitter.
I check Facebook.
I check-in to my apartment on Foursquare,' which I've
named something cute and clever because for some
reason I think people actually care what I call my
apartment on a mobile application named after a
* Juris Doctor Candidate, 2013, University of California, Hastings College of the Law;
Senior Articles Editor, Volume 40 of the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly; Bachelor of
Arts in Sociology and Anthropology, 2009, University of California, Berkeley. The author
would like to thank Professor Hadar Aviram for her guidance, the editors of the Hastings
Constitutional Law Quarterly, especially Jonathan August for his patience and sagacity, and
her family and friends for their support.
1. Foursquare is a location-based social networking service that enables users to "check
in" to places they visit and share their location with their friends. As of 2012, Foursquare has
over twenty-five million users and three billion check-ins, with millions of check-ins daily.
Launched in 2009 by co-founders Dennis Crowley and Naveen Selvadurai, the company is
based in San Francisco, California. (About foursquare, FOURSQUARE.COM, http://foursquare.
comlabout/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
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children's playground game. They don't. I just wanted
the mayorship, let's be honest....




I check-in to BART on Foursquare, because everyone
needs to know that I'm about to take public
transportation.... To be fair: I've heard if you check
into BART 10 times you get the "Trainspotter" badge.
I don't know why this is important to me. But it is. I
need that badge....
I get to work ....
I check Twitter.
I check Facebook.
I get lunch at some place that is overpriced. I check in
to their establishment on Foursquare.
When I return to work, I will sign up for a social
networking site that is new. It will involve:
1) Taking artsy pictures and sharing them with people.
2) Telling people about the music I'm listening to.
3) Telling people what I'm doing, right now, this
instant, right now, this instant, no seriously, right now.
4) Telling people what I've eaten.
5) Doing all four of these things at once while then
distrubuting [sic] this to Twitter, Facebook and
Foursquare.
Introduction
You sacrifice some privacy when you leave your home. Someone
might see you enter the abortion clinic or AIDS testing center, a strip
club or gay bar, a picket line or Occupy protest, or notice you and your
secretary leaving a hotel together. Obtaining this information used to be
expensive.3 Your enemies had to pay someone to follow you around and
it was difficult to keep surveillance a secret because you could notice
2. Drew Hoolhorst, A Day in the Life of a Modern San Franciscan, ROCKET SHOES
(July 12,2011) http://www.rocket-shoes.comla-day-in-the-life-of-the-modern-san-franciscan/.
3. Andrew J. Blumberg & Peter Eckersly, On Locational Privacy, and How to Avoid
Losing It Forever, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, 2 (Aug., 2009) https://www.eff.org/
files/eff-locational-privacy.pdf.
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your tail skulking in your shadow. Today, obtaining this information is
cheap. Information about your location "is quietly collected by
ubiquitous devices and applications, and available for analysis to many
parties who can query, buy or subpeona [sic] it."' The technological
transformation from visual surveillance to remote tracking has eroded
our locational privacy, i.e., "the ability of an individual to move in public
space with the expectation that under normal circumstances their
location will not be systematically and secretly recorded for later use."6
Apple, AT&T, and the government are not solely to blame-we
check in on Foursquare and Facebook Places', broadcast our location in
real-time using Google Latitude8, and let OkCupid use our location to
find us people to date nearby. Use of location-based applications and
services ("LBS") like these is not only commonplace, it is becoming
increasingly necessary to fully participate in society today. However,
when we use privacy controls to limit who can access this information,
we do not expect that the government will obtain it. Existing privacy
law does not provide enough protection for our digital location
information. If digital privacy law does not evolve to comport with
modern technologies and society's use of them, then Big Brother will be
a reality.
In United States v. Katz, the Supreme Court held that the FBI's use
of an electronic eavesdropping device to record Katz's private
conversation in a public telephone booth constituted a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.o Recognizing "the vital role that
the public telephone has come to play in private communication,"" the
Court held both that physical intrusion is not necessary to constitute a
4. Id. at 2.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1.
7. Announced in August 2012, Places enables Facebook users to share their location
and the friends they are with in real time from their mobile device. (Michael Eyal Sharon,
Who, What, When, and Now.. .Where, THE FACEBOOK BLOG (Aug. 18, 2010)
https://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=418175202130.
8. Google Latitude enables users to share their location and see where their friends are
on a map in real time. Latitude's "location history" feature optionally records and analyzes a
user's location and time spent at each place over time.
9. OkCupid is a free online dating website with over eight million users. In 2011,
OkCupid launched the "Locals" feature, enabling users to locate and chat with matches
within close proximity. (Kat Hannaford, OkCupid Adds Grindr-Like Location Feature for
Quick Shags or Romantic Dates, GIZMODO (Aug. 12, 2011), http://gizmodo.com/5830259
/okcupid-adds-grindr+like-location-feature-for-quick-shags-or-romantic-dates).
10. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
11. Id. at 353.
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search and "being 'in public' is not a binary state-that is, one can be
exposed to the public in some respects but not in others."" Just like the
telephone in the 1960s, electronic communications, such as email, text
messages and LBS user location information, play a vital role in private
communication today.
This note will discuss whether current Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence adequately protects user location information obtained
from LBS, and if not, what changes can be made to ensure our right to
privacy in this digital information. In Part I, the concept of LBS and a
technical description of how it works will be discussed. Part II will
summarize the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Jones
on warrantless prolonged use of a GPS tracking device and will outline
the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence underpinning the Court's logic.
Part III will deliver an in-depth description of federal statutory law that
applies to the seizure of electronic information. Part IV will debate
whether and to what extent LBS user location data is protected under
applicable federal statutes and will analogize to current case law on
similar electronic communications. Part V will survey recently proposed
reforms to the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
("ECPA").13
This note concludes that LBS user location information-and
electronic communications generally-must receive Fourth Amendment
protection, despite the fact that they are transmitted through
intermediaries and their content is possibly shared with more than one
person. The law changes incrementally, while technology does not.
Technological change is disruptive. Current Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is outdated and will soon be overwhelmed, structurally
unable to bear the wave of new LBS on the horizon. As information
technology continues to reshape American life, we need clear and strong
rules to protect the privacy of our electronic communications. The goal
of this note is to emphasize the importance of treating electronic
communications, including LBS user location information, with the
restraint dictated by the Fourth Amendment.
12. Jay Stanley, The Crisis in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, AMERICAN
CONsTITUTION SOCIETY, 14 (May 2010), http://www.acslaw.org/files/ACS%20Issue%
20Brief%20-%2OStanley%204th%2OAmendment.pdf.
13. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
928 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OUARTERLY [Vol. 40:4
I. LBS Technology
A. What is LBS?
In the United States, 101.3 million mobile subscribers use
smartphones as of January 2012.14 A recent report by venture capital
firm, Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers shows that there are 172 million
smartphone subscribers in the United States as of the fourth quarter of
2012." 50.4% of mobile subscribers in the United States own a
smartphone," and 46% of American adults have a smartphone." 67% of
adults ages eighteen to twenty-four have a smartphone, and 71% of
adults ages twenty-five to thirty-four have a smartphone." 28% of
American adults use mobile or social location-based services of some
kind." 55% of smartphone owners use their device to get location-based
directions and recommendations, and nearly one in five access check-in
services via their device, with 36% of eighteen to twenty-four year olds
and 32.5% of twenty-five to thirty-four year olds using geosocial services
such as Foursquare and Facebook Places.20
Location-based mobile applications and services are "any
application or service that receives a consumer's location and provides
that consumer with information or services tailored to that location."
LBS offer a wide array of services: navigation tools to help users reach
14. comScore Reports January 2012 U.S. Mobile Subscriber Market Share, More Than
100 Million U.S. Mobile Subscribers Now Use Smartphones, COMSCORE (Mar. 6, 2012),
http://www.comscore.com/Press-Events/PressReleases/2012/3/comScoreReports-
January_2012_U.S._Mobile_SubscriberMarketShare.
15. Mary Meeker, 2012 KPCB Internet Trends Year-End Update, (Dec. 3, 2012)
http://www.slideshare.net/kleinerperkins/2012-kpcb-internet-trends-yearend-update.
16. America's New Mobile Majority: a Look atSmartphone Owners in the U.S., NIELSON
(May 7,2012) http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/online-mobile/who-owns-smartphones-in-
the-us/.
17. Aaron Smith, Nearly half of American adults are smartphone owners, PEW
INTERNET, 2 (Mar. 1, 2012), http://pewinternet.org/-/media//Files/Reports/2012/Smartphone
%20ownership%202012.pdf.
18. Id. at 4.
19. Kathryn Zickuhr & Aaron Smith, 28% of American adult use mobile and social
location-based services, PEW INTERNET, 2 (Sept. 6, 2011), http://pewinternet.org/-/media/
/Files/Reports/2011/PIP Location-based-services.pdf
20. Nearly I in 5 Smartphone Owners Access Check-in Services Via their Mobile Device,
COMSCORE (May 12,2011), http://www.comscore.com/Press Events/PressReleases/2011/5/
Nearly_1_in_5_SmartphoneOwnersAccessCheck-InServicesViatheirMobileDevice.
21. Nicole A. Ozer, Chris Conley, Hari O'Connell, Ellen Ginsburg & Tamar Gubins,
Location-Based Services: Time fora Privacy Check-in, ACLUOF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, 2
(Nov., 2010), http://dotrights.org/sites/default/files/lbs-white-paper.pdf.
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their destination2 (e.g.. Google Maps); local search applications to help
users find and review nearby businesses (e.g., Yelp); location sharing
applications that allow users to check in to their location and share it
with their friends (e.g., Foursquare, Facebook Places); social
networking' applications that allow users to geotag content such as
photos and posts and share it with their friends (e.g., Facebook,
Twitter); ambient social networking applications that run in the
background on a smartphone and enhance serendipity by alerting users
in real-time to nearby friends or individuals with whom they have
affinity (e.g., Google Latitude, Highlight, Sonar); and dating
applications that allow users to find romantic and sexual partners nearby
(e.g., OkCupid, Grindr). Currently, many users access LBS through
mobile phones, but other location-aware devices, such as tablets and
laptops can also be used to access many LBS.24
By using LBS, users "allow companies to compile detailed profiles
of their lives: the places they visit, the events they attend, the people
they meet, and more."5 Many LBS collect and store this sensitive
information in accordance with terms of service and privacy policies,
creating detailed profiles for use in targeted advertising and other
purposes. 6 Selling this user data, usually in aggregated form, to external
partners enables LBS to provide a free service to users. Partnering with
LBS presents an opportunity for mobile advertisers and publishers to
increase their conversion rates; using detailed information about
consumers to serve targeted advertisements and deliver relevant content
to users based on their location at any moment.27 As smartphones and
LBS proliferate, more and more companies will possess detailed and
sensitive information about users." Commercial possession of user
information presents serious privacy implications for users.
Currently, it is unclear what legal protections are afforded LBS
user-location information, and some even argue that Fourth
22. Id. at 1.
23. Sara E. Brown, Note, An Illusory Expectation of Privacy: The ECPA is Insufficient to
Provide Meaningful Protection for Advanced Communication Tools, 114W. VA. L. REV. 277,
289 ("social networking is a controlled communication knowingly shared in a specific manner
to a specific person or a specific group of people.. . . [It is] a communication knowingly shared
the way the user intends." (emphasis added)).
24. Ozer et al., supra note 21, at 1.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 2, 3.
27. Conversion rate is the proportion of visitors to a website who take a desired action as
a result of subtle or explicit requests from advertisers.
28. Id. at 3.
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Amendment jurisprudence and statutory law may extinguish Fourth
Amendment protection in such information." The Supreme Court has
held that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in their
bank records and the phone numbers they dial, even if they intend the
third party to whom this information is provided to keep that
information secret, because they assume the risk that the third party will
share that information with the government. But LBS users do not
necessarily expect that the information they communicate to intended
recipients via non-sentient electromechanical devices and software
applications will be accessible by service providers' individual employees
who could disclose that information to the government. Furthermore,
users do not expect that by providing their information to LBS, the
government can stand in the shoes of commercial entities, vitiating
Fourth Amendment protection of LBS user location information.
Although enacted to extend restrictions on the government's ability
to access electronic communications, the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 198630 allows the government to compel disclosure of
some user data merely under a subpoena or pursuant to a court order
with prior notice." Whether user location information held by LBS falls
into this category is unknown, and no case law exists on the subject.
LBS users should not have to choose between adopting new
technologies that advance the progress of society and forsaking the legal
protections afforded them under the Fourth Amendment.
B. How LBS Determine Your Location
The technology behind LBS, and the user data collected by LBS,
has implications for the level of Fourth Amendment protection afforded
users' location information. LBS determine location in four ways: GPS,
cell-site information ("CSI"), Wi-Fi geolocation, and user actions
specifying their current location.32 Currently, the most accurate way to
determine a user's location is GPS. A GPS device locates its position by
determining the transit time of messages it receives from at least three
satellites in orbit high above the Earth; then, through a process called
trilateration, these values are used to draw spheres around the device
29. Christian Levis, Note, Smartphone, Dumb Regulations: Mixed Signals in Mobile
Privacy, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 191, 207 (2011) ("Regardless of
where something falls within the ECPA, individuals lose any reasonable expectation of
privacy they may have in information that is knowingly disclosed to the public.").
30. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat, 1848
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
31. Stored Communication Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(B)(i-ii).
32. Levis, supra note 29, at 197-98.
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with their intersection indicating the device's exact position on the
ground." In a cell phone, the receiver is a chip within the phone.'
A cell phone transmits and receives signals throughout a cellular
network, which is divided into cells." A cell site, also referred to as a
cell tower, is the point where three cells meet. 6 When a cell phone is
turned on, it scans the strength of every potential cell site by periodically
transmitting a signal to the network." When a call is placed, the phone
connects to the cell site with the strongest signal. 8 To avoid dropping a
call when the signal strength of site servicing the call decreases, the call
transfers to an adjacent cell site with a stronger signal. 9 Cell site data is
captured as a cell phone scans the network for the cell site with the
strongest signal.' Cell site data can be interpreted in real-time or
historically from company records to determine the location of a cell
phone at any given time."
The Wi-Fi geolocation method "uses various location-based clues,"
such as "the media access control ('MAC') address of other available
Wi-Fi networks, cell towers, Bluetooth ... radio-frequency identifier
('RFID'), Cell-ID and GPS signal" to determine the location of a phone
currently accessing the Internet. 42 A user can voluntarily specify their
location by "checking in," "tagging" content, or broadcasting their
location by running a LBS networking app in the background.
C. What LBS Know About You
LBS access a user's location data stored on their device and
information obtained through integration with social networks to
spotlight people and places around them.43 The level of access granted is
determined by a set of controls called permissions. In order to gain
permission, most privacy policies inform users about: (1) the type of
33. Id.
34. Derek P. Richmond, Comment, Can You Find Me Now?-Tracking the Limits on
Government Access to Cellular GPS Location Data, 16 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 283, 285
(2007).
35. Aaron Blank, Article, The Limitations and Admissibility of Using Historical Cellular
Site Data to Track the Location of a Cellular Phone, 18 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3, $ 5 (2011).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1 6.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 16.
40. Id. at 1 10.
41. Id.
42. Levis, supra note 29, at 200.
43. Id. at 201.
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information collected; and (2) the purpose for collecting that
information." By allowing a requested permission, a user consents to
the collection of their information by the LBS.45  LBS companies
subsequently collect and mine user data for a variety of "legitimate
business purposes," including serving targeted ads, improving relevancy,
and improving the service.
In his concurrence in United States v. Jones, Justice Samuel Alito
suggests that while new technologies "may provide increased
convenience or security at the expense of privacy, [] many people may
find the tradeoff worthwhile." 47 LBS users consent to the collection and
mining of their user data in exchange for free use of the app or service.
Perhaps what we should be concerned about is the aggregate of user
data-not just what an app knows about me, but what it knows about
us-because this powerful knowledge about human behavior and
decision making can be leveraged to design persuasive technologies.'
How LBS work technically and what they know about users has
implications for the Fourth Amendment protection afforded to LBS
user location information. Since LBS user location information is a
form of electronic communication, it is governed by the ECPA. The
technical attributes of electronic communications determine how LBS
user data is classified under the ECPA; this classification in turn
determines the standard that the government must meet to compel
disclosure of electronic communications from service providers. Privacy
protection afforded by the ECPA is intended to reflect the reasonable
expectation of privacy a user holds in his electronic communications. In
this way, the ECPA is built on a foundation of Fourth Amendment law.
Before we can understand how the ECPA will play a role in
governing LBS information, it is crucial to first look at the evolution of
44. Id. at 202-203. For an example of how privacy policies inform users, check out
Foursquare's privacy policy, available at https://Foursquare.com/legal/privacy (last updated
Jan. 28, 2013).
45. Id. at 207.
46. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979).
47. United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 962 (Alito, J., concurring).
48. Alexander Furnas, It's Not AllAbout You: What Privacy Advocates Don't Get About
Data Tracking on the Web, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/
technology/archive/2012/03/its-not-all-about-you-what-privacy-advocates-dont-get-about-
data-tracking-on-the-web/254533/ ("Detailed knowledge of individuals and their behavior
coupled with the aggregate data on human behavior now available at unprecedented scale
grants incredible power. Knowing about all of us-how we behave, how our behavior has
changed over time, under what conditions our behavior is subject to change, and what factors
are likely to impact our decision-making under various conditions-provides a roadmap for
designing persuasive technologies.").
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Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and its most recent controversial
case.
II. United States v. Jones and Fourth Amendment Law
In January 2012, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Jones
that the government's warrantless installation of a GPS device on a
target's vehicle and its use of that device to track the vehicle's
movements constituted a search because it was a physical trespass on a
constitutionally protected area.9 But what of the situation in which the
government conducts prolonged surveillance without physical trespass;
for instance, remotely tracking a target through his GPS-enabled
smartphone or obtaining a Foursquare user's check-in history? By
basing their holding in property-based theory, the majority sidestepped
the larger issue of whether the government's use of a GPS device to
monitor the movements of the target's vehicle for twenty-eight days
violated his reasonable expectation of privacy.so
Lower federal and state courts have decided whether data obtained
from a GPS tracking device," cell-site location information,52 email 53 and
Facebook posts$4 receive Fourth Amendment protection. Whether users
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their LBS location
information-and whether and to what extent it receives Fourth
Amendment protection-is unclear. Like the government's use of a
GPS device to monitor Jones' location over a prolonged period of time,
LBS can create a record of a user's location information over time,
revealing intimate details about that user's life. However, unlike in
Jones, the government need not accomplish a physical trespass to obtain
LBS location data. Therefore, the Court's decision in Jones does not
49. 132 S.Ct. 945, 949-50 (2012) (majority opinion).
50. Id. at 954 (majority opinion) ("It may be that achieving the same result through
electronic means, without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of
privacy, but the present case does not require us to answer that question."); see also id. ("We
may have to grapple with these 'vexing problems' in some future case where a classic
trespassory search is not involved and resort must be had to Katz analysis; but there is no
reason for rushing forward to resolve them here.").
51. United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Marquez, 605
F.3d 604 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010);
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544,549 (D.C. Cir. 2010) cert. denied. 131 S. Ct. 671 (U.S.
2010) and cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (U.S. 2011) and aff'd in part sub nom. Jones, at 945.
52. In re Application of the United States of America for an Order Authorizing the
Release of Historical Cell-Site Information, No. 10-MC-0897 (JO), 2010 WL 5437209
(E.D.N.Y. 2010).
53. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).
54. Crispin v. Christian Audigier, 717 F. Supp. 2d 965 (9th Cir. 2010).
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proscribe the government's ability to obtain LBS data in violation of a
user's reasonable expectation of privacy.
A. Foundational Fourth Amendment Case Law
The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized."
The Framers drafted the Fourth Amendment to protect against the
use of general warrants and writs of assistance, which they considered
tyrannical remnants of English law that threatened "personal security,
personal liberty, and private property."06 Today, Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is in need of reform. The two principal problems are
third-party doctrine and the reasonable expectation of privacy test,
which when applied to LBS user location information-among other
electronic communications--extinguish its Fourth Amendment
protection." The Fourth Amendment case law that forms the
foundation for Jones and why the Court's affirmation of the D.C. Circuit
on narrow trespass grounds rather than the reasonable expectation of
privacy test is crucial for future LBS cases. Additionally, although it
went beyond the immediate issue-a situation involving a physical
trespass-the Court's statement about a situation in which no physical
trespass by the government occurs has a bearing on whether LBS user
location information receives Fourth Amendment protection.
Citing United States v. Knotts, the government argued in the D.C.
Circuit Court companion to Jones, United States v. Maynard, that the
defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movements in an automobile on public streets." In its opinion, however,
55. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
56. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390-91 (1914) (internal citations omitted)
overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
57. Stanley, The Crisis in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, supra note 12, at 1.
58. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544,556 (D.C. Cir. 2010). See United States v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) ("A person traveling in an automobile on public
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
another.").
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the D.C. Circuit distinguished the government's prolonged surveillance
of Jones from the surveillance of an automobile traveling on public
streets in Knotts." In Knotts, the government attached a beeper to a
container of chloroform prior to purchase by one of Knotts's co-
conspirators." Police officers followed the vehicle in which the
container had been placed, maintaining visual contact with the vehicle
and monitoring the radio signals emitted from the beeper to track the
vehicle's movement on public streets.61 Relying on information acquired
during the short-term surveillance, officers obtained a search warrant for
a cabin occupied by Knotts and discovered a drug laboratory, leading to
his conviction.62
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, recited the evolution of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence from Olmstead v. United States"
through Katz v. United States." In Olmstead, the Court held that a
Fourth Amendment violation required a physical trespass by the
government into a constitutionally protected area.5 In Katz, the Court
evolved the doctrine and held that:
[T)he Fourth Amendment protects people not places.
What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in
his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection . . . But what he seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected.6
Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz created the famous two-prong
test to determine whether a government action is a search under the
Fourth Amendment: "first that a person has exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."6 7
Applying Katz in Knotts, the Court determined that the
government's use of the beeper to monitor Knott's co-conspirator as he
59. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556.
60. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 279.
63. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
64. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
65. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 280 (discussing Olmstead).
66. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
67. Id. at 361.
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drove with the container on public streets was not a search or seizure
under the Fourth Amendment because "[a] person traveling in an
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in his movements from one place to another."" In support of its
holding, the Court cited a lesser expectation of privacy in automobiles,69
and public exposure of a person's movements while traveling in an
automobile on public thoroughfares. 0 The Court noted that "[n]othing
in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the
sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as
science and technology afforded them in this case.""
Further developing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, in Kyllo v.
United States, the Supreme Court held that the government's use of a
thermal imaging device not in general public use from a public vantage
point to measure the heat emanating from a man's home constituted a
search within the meaning of Fourth Amendment." Justice Scalia
specifically authored his opinion with an eye towards the "long view" of
the Fourth Amendment and the ability of future technologies to invade
one's right to privacy." The government's use of the thermal imager was
presumptively unreasonable without a warrant because it revealed
"details of the home that previously would have been unknowable
without physical intrusion."" The Court rejected the distinction
between "off the wall" and "through the wall" surveillance, drawing a
"firm but also bright" line at the "entrance to the house."5 Simply put,
the Fourth Amendment is implicated when the government intrudes
upon the privacy of the home, a constitutionally protected area." The
Court's decisions in Katz, Knotts, and Kyllo all focus squarely on the
target's reasonable expectation of privacy.
68. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 280,285.
69. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,151 (1925) (ready mobility of automobiles
creates an inherent exigency: destruction of evidence); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590
(1974) (automobiles are used for transportation on public roadways exposing occupants and
contents to public view); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392-93 (1985) (automobiles are
readily mobile and subject to regulation and inspection.).
70. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-282 (When a person "travel[s] over the public streets he
voluntarily convey[s] to anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was traveling over
particular roads in a particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he made, and the fact of
his final destination when he exited from public roads onto private property.").
71. Id. at 282.
72. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 30-31 (2001).
73. Id. at 40.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 36.
76. Id. at 34.
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The problem with the reasonable expectation of privacy test is that
it involves a degree of circularity.n "[P]eople get only the privacy that
they expect to get. Under this standard, even the most reprehensible
invasions of privacy might lose constitutional protection if a realistic
person is forced to conclude that their privacy will in fact be
invaded. . ."" Jay Stanley suggests that replacing "expectation" with
"desire for" or "intention to preserve" would eliminate the circularity.79
According to a survey by Morgan Stanley, 91% of people keep their
phone within three feet of themselves twenty-four hours a day.8 Unlike
GPS devices affixed on vehicles that monitor the target's movements
only when he is in the vehicle, phones kept within a three-foot radius at
all times expose a target's movements everywhere, even within his home
as he moves from the bedroom to the bathroom. This revelation of the
"details of the home" is precisely what the Fourth Amendment is
designed to protect. The government need not commit a physical
trespass to monitor a target's location simply by remotely accessing
location data from his phone. After the Court's holding in United States
v. Jones, whether this kind of surveillance without a warrant would
constitute an unconstitutional search is unclear.
Although not the controlling opinion on the government's
prolonged surveillance of Jones, the D.C. Circuit's rationale in Maynard
for ruling that Jones had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movement maps well onto the case of LBS user location information. In
Knotts, the Court held that the defendant did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his movements on public roadways because he
exposed his movements to the public."' In Maynard, the D.C. Circuit
refused to apply the public exposure doctrine articulated in Knotts to
prolonged surveillance:
First, unlike one's movement during a single journey, the
whole of one's movements over the course of a month is
not actually exposed to the public because the likelihood
anyone will observe all those movements is effectively
77. Stanley, The Crisis in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, supra note 12, at 5.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Mary Meeker, David Joseph, and Richard Ji, Technology/Internet Trends, MORGAN
STANLEY RESEARCH (Oct. 18,2007), http://www.slideshare.net/misteroo/web2-139178.
81. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-282 (1983). (See also Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347,351 (1967) ("What a person knowingly exposes to the public ... is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.")).
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nil. Second, the whole of one's movements is not
exposed constructively even though each individual
movement is exposed, because that whole reveals
more-sometimes a great deal more-than does the sum
of its parts.
To determine whether something is exposed to the public "we ask
not what another person can physically and may lawfully do but rather
what a reasonable person expects another might actually do."" In the
case of driving one's car, "[a] reasonable person does not expect anyone
to monitor and retain a record of every time he drives his car .. .rather
he expects each of those movements to remain disconnected and
anonymous."" Although using LBS such as Foursquare and Facebook
Places can deliberately connect a user's movements from place to place
and affirmatively make known their identity to a circumscribed
audience, users do not necessarily expect that their LBS location
information will be accessible by persons outside of that chosen
audience, including the government. LBS users can try to claim a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their location information when
they utilize privacy settings to limit the audience with whom they share
it."
To arrive at its holding that Jones had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the aggregate of his movements as surveilled by the
government twenty-four hours a day for twenty-eight days, the D.C.
Circuit applied mosaic theory to Fourth Amendment law." Mosaic
theory posits that the whole may reveal more than the sum of its parts.'
The rationale behind mosaic theory is that "subjects [have] a privacy
interest in the aggregated 'whole' distinct from their interest in the 'bits
of information' of which it [is] composed."" Applying mosaic theory in
Maynard, the D.C. Circuit determined that "[p]rolonged surveillance
82. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
83. Id. at 559.
84. Id. at 563 (internal quotation marks omitted).
85. See United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1215 (2010) (holding that a
warrantless attachment of a mobile tracking device to the underside of Pineda-Moreno'
vehicle while it was parked in his driveway was not a search and that he had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in it because he did not take steps to exclude passersby).
86. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 565 ("prolonged GPS monitoring reveals an intimate picture of
the subject life that he expects no one to have.").
87. Id. at 558.
88. Id. at 561 (quoting United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press, 498 U.S. 749, 764 (1989)).
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reveals types of information not revealed by short-term surveillance" or
by "any individual trip viewed in isolation."" Similar concerns arise
when looking at LBS information over a long period of time.
B. The Facts of United States v. Jones
In 2004, Antoine Jones came under suspicion of trafficking cocaine
and became a target of an investigation by the FBI and the Metropolitan
Police Department.' In 2005, the government obtained a warrant
authorizing the installation and use of a GPS tracking device on Jones'
vehicle for ten days in the District of Columbia." On the eleventh day-
after the warrant expired-the government installed a GPS tracking
device to the undercarriage of Jones' vehicle while it was parked in a
public parking lot located in Maryland." The government used the GPS
device to track the vehicle's movements for twenty-eight days." The
location data obtained by the government's use of the GPS device
provided key evidence supporting Jones' conviction for drug
trafficking.94
On appeal, Jones argued that the government's installation of a
GPS device on his vehicle without a valid warrant and its use of the
device to track his movements twenty-four hours a day for twenty-eight
days constituted a search in violation of his Fourth Amendment right to
privacy.5 As previously described, the D.C. Circuit held that the
government's warrantless use of the GPS device to monitor the
movements of Jones' vehicle for twenty-four hours a day for twenty-
eight days "was a search because it defeated Jones' reasonable
expectation of privacy."6 This note argues, infra, that the standard
articulated by the D.C. Circuit for evaluating whether or not a person's
expectation of privacy is reasonable is a fair and workable standard for
determining Fourth Amendment protection of LBS user location
information.
89. Id. at 562.




94. Id. at 948-49; United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544,549 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
95. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 555.
96. Id. at 555-56.
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C. The Jones Decision
In Jones, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed Maynard in that
the government's warrantless installation of a GPS tracking device to
Jones' vehicle and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle's
movements on public streets constituted a search under the Fourth
Amendment." The wide variety of rationales used by the court in
Justice Scalia's majority opinion, Justice Sotomayor's concurrence, and
Justice Alito's concurrence will certainly have wide ranging effects on
future LBS cases.
1. Scalia Majority
Justice Scalia took a property-based approach in Jones, ruling that
the attachment of the GPS device to Jones' vehicle for the purpose of
monitoring the vehicle's movements on public streets constituted a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.9 8 Putting to use
his brand of originalism, Justice Scalia posited, "[t]he text of the Fourth
Amendment reflects its close connection to property,"" and that the
Court must preserve the "degree of privacy against the Government that
existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted."'" Justice Scalia
declared that the reasonable expectation of privacy test articulated in
Katz supplemented, but did not displace, the common-law trespassory
test.o' The government's attachment of a GPS device to Jones' vehicle
was simply a physical invasion into a constitutionally protected space for
the purpose of obtaining information, thus violating the Fourth
Amendment.02
Furthermore, Justice Scalia determined it was unnecessary to
conduct an analysis of Jones' reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movements because the government's trespass on Jones' vehicle was
sufficient to find a Fourth Amendment violation.0o However, he stated
97. United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 951 (2012).
98. Id. at 949 ("The Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of
obtaining information.... such a physical intrusion would have been considered a 'search'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.").
99. Id.
100. Id. at 950 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)).
101. Id. ("The Fourth Amendment was understood to embody a particular concern for
government trespass upon the areas ('persons, houses, papers, and effects') it enumerates.
Katz did not repudiate that understanding."); see also id. at 952 ("the Katz reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory
test.).
102. Id. at 949.
103. Id. at 950.
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that searches conducted without physical trespass "involving merely the
transmission of electronic signals ... would remain subject to Katz
analysis.". Justice Scalia did not address the length of time for which
warrantless tracking accomplished without physical trespass would be
constitutionally permissible.os
2. Sotomayor Concurrence
Justice Sotomayor agreed with the majority that Katz's reasonable
expectation of privacy test did not repudiate the common-law
tresspassory test: "When the Government physically invades personal
property to gather information, a search occurs."'0 Like Justice Scalia,
Justice Sotomayor concluded that, "in the absence of a trespass, 'a
Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government violates a
subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as
reasonable.'"'" Justice Sotomayor's view that the reasonable
expectation of privacy test still applies in the absence of a trespass
supports the argument that LBS location data should receive
constitutional protection-a user demonstrates his subjective
expectation of privacy in his location information by utilizing privacy
settings, and society recognizes that it is reasonable to expect that
information shared with a finite audience will remain private.
Unlike Justice Scalia, however, Justice Sotomayor problematized
the application of the reasonable expectation of privacy test to
technological advancements that allow the government to conduct
prolonged surveillance without committing physical trespass, such as
GPS-enabled smartphones.o Justice Sotomayor suggested that
attributes of GPS surveillance-such as its ability to "generate[] a
precise, comprehensive record of a person's [] movements that reflect a
wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and
sexual associations," and the government's ability to "store such records
and efficiently mine them for information years into the future"; as well
as its potential for abuse by law enforcementl09-be taken into account
when assessing society's reasonable expectation of privacy in the sum of
104. Id. at 953.
105. Id. at 954.
106. Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 954-955 (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33).
108. Id. at 956.
109. Id. ("GPS is monitoring is cheap in comparison to conventional surveillance
techniques and by design, proceeds surreptitiously.").
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a person's public movements.no Like the D.C. Circuit in Maynard,
Justice Sotomayor would ask "whether people reasonably expect that
their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that
enables the Government to ascertain.. . their political and religious
beliefs, sexual habits, and so on."' Similarly, LBS users do not expect
that the location information they share to a restricted audience will be
accessible by the government for use in criminal proceedings against
them.
3. Alito Concurrence
Justice Alito concurred in the judgment that the government's
attachment and use of the GPS device to monitor Jones' movements
constituted a search, but reached that result by determining that the
government's long-term monitoring of the movements of Jones' vehicle
violated his reasonable expectation of privacy."2 Justice Alito argued
that 18th-century tort law of trespass to chattels should not apply to a
21st-century surveillance technique like GPS."' Unlike the majority,
Justice Alito argued that Katz did not merely supplement, but indeed
repudiated the trespassory doctrine." He was unsettled by the fact that
accomplishing prolonged surveillance without committing a technical
trespass is afforded no protection under the Court's theory."'
Although Justice Alito argued that the case should have been
decided according to Katz's reasonable expectation of privacy test, he
admitted the test "involves a degree of circularity" and "judges are apt
to confuse their own expectations of privacy with those of the
hypothetical reasonable person to which the Katz test looks."" 6
Additionally, Justice Alito acknowledged that, "technology can change
those expectations."" 7 For these reasons, Justice Alito suggested that
Congress is best suited to regulate law enforcement's use of GPS
110. Id.
111. Id. See also United States v. Maynard 615 F.3d 544,563 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ("We ask
not what another person can physically and may lawfully do but rather what a reasonable
person expects another might actually do."); Id. at 558 ("A reasonable person does not expect
anyone to monitor and retain a record of every time he drives his car.").
112. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 958 (Alito, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 957.
114. Id. at 960.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 962.
117. Id.
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tracking technology by enacting legislation to protect against invasions
of privacy occasioned by new technology.18
4. Implications of Jones
Although unanimous in its decision, the Court split divisively as to
why a search occurred in Jones. Using a property-based approach, the
majority held that a search occurred because the government physically
invaded a constitutionally protected space."' Four justices, however, did
not buy the property line of reasoning and failed to agree that the simple
attachment of the GPS device to Jones' vehicle was a search."
Alarmingly, should one justice join these four in a future case, it is
possible that the Court could "establish[] a majority holding that the
installation of [a] GPS device does not require a warrant."2 ' While the
Court's opinions suggest that short-term monitoring without a warrant
may be legal'"2-particularly when accomplished without physical
trespass"-it appears that five justices are "willing to accept the
principle that government surveillance over time can implicate an
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy."24 The line dividing
permissible short-term monitoring from illegal extended monitoring is
unclear, but tracking Jones for four weeks certainly falls on the side of
an unconstitutionally lengthy surveillance.'25
Unlike vehicles, which people enter and exit upon inception and
termination of a trip, cell phones are carried on one's person and "can
be monitored indoors where the expectation of privacy is the
118. Id. at 962, 964 (Alito, J., concurring) ("In circumstances involving dramatic
technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative.... A
legislative body is well situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and
to balance privacy and public safety n a comprehensive way.").
119. Id. at 953 (majority opinion).
120. Id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring) ("It is clear that the attachment of the GPS device
was not itself a search.").
121. Jesse Koehler, United States v. Jones Decided?, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (Mar. 5,2012)
http://btlj.org/2012/03/05/united-states-v-jones-decided/.
122. Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) ("Relatively short-term monitoring of a
person's movements on public streets accords with expectations of privacy that our society has
recognized as reasonable.... But the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of
most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.").
123. Id. at 954 (majority opinion).
124. United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384 (D. Md. 2012).
125. Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) ("the line was surely crossed before the
4-week mark").
944 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY (Vol. 40:4
greatest.""' Because people have their smartphone in their pocket or
purse constantly, often charging their phone at their bedside, the
government's monitoring of an individual by remotely tracking the
location of his smartphone is potentially a great deal more invasive than
monitoring the location of his vehicle by GPS.'27 In United States v.
Karo, the Court held that the government's placement of a beeper on a
container that was tracked to reveal its presence in the interior of a
home was an impermissible search because the beeper enabled the
government to apprehend details about the interior that would
otherwise be unknowable without physical intrusion" Crucial in Karo,
however, was the fact that the beeper was used to track the whereabouts
of a container, not an individual. Tracking the location of a smartphone
may reveal intimate details about the inside of a home that could be
obtained only by physically entering the home and visually surveilling it.
As discussed infra, it is problematic to define privacy according to the
four walls of a home.' The fact that smartphone tracking can reveal an
individual's location everywhere he travels is an invasion of privacy,
regardless of whether his location is inside a home.
I. Fourth Amendment Protection of LBS
User Location Information
Now with a thorough understanding of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, it is possible to look at current federal law and its
interplay with LBS. This section will first define and explain one of the
key concepts underpinning federal law before examining the statutes
themselves.
126. In re Application of the United States of America for Historical Cell Site Data
(hereinafter "Historical Cell Site Data"), 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 840 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
127. In Graham, the defendants argued that "allowing the government to retroactively
track or surveil a suspect through his cellular telephone, a device he likely carries with him at
all hours of the day and to constitutionally protected places such as his home or church" is an
unconstitutional invasion of privacy. See also Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 834-
35 (S.D. Tex. 2010) ("Cell phones are frequently used in the home or in other places not open
to public view: one study shows that at least 52% of cell phone calls are made indoors;
another study indicates that two out of three adults sleep with their cell phone nearby.").
128. 468 U.S. 705,715 (1984).
129. Jim Harper, Kerr Defends the Third-Party Doctrine, The Technology Liberation
Front (May 30, 2008), http://techliberation.com/2008/05/30/kerr-defends-the-third-party-
doctrine/.
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A. Third-Party Doctrine in the Context of LBS
The third-party doctrine is the principle that voluntary revelation of
information to a third party relinquishes Fourth Amendment protection
of that information because one assumes the risk that the third party will
convey that information to the government, "even if the information is
revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited
purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be
betrayed."O Under a strict interpretation of third-party doctrine, a
user's disclosure of his location information to LBS vitiates his Fourth
Amendment protection in that information."'
Scholars like Oren Kerr argue that third-party doctrine has utility in
modern society because it prevents criminals from using third party
technologies to avoid detection."' Additionally, Kerr points out that
third-party doctrine is really nothing more than a "consent doctrine,"
and that it results in weak privacy protection for electronic
information.' Specifically, he identifies three ways in which there is
weak privacy protection: first, users cannot retain a reasonable
expectation of privacy in information revealed to third parties; second,
the government does not need to first obtain a warrant based on
probable cause to subpoena the target's materials in the possession of a
third party; and third, under private search doctrine, even if the Fourth
Amendment protects information entrusted to a third party, as a private
actor the third party may divulge that information to the government
without committing a Fourth Amendment violation.'
130. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,443 (1976) (holding no reasonable expectation
of privacy in bank records because they are "negotiable instruments to be used in commercial
transactions" and "contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed
to their employees in the ordinary course of business"). See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735, 743 (1979) (holding that the government's installation of a pen register was not a search
because telephone users lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial and
distinguishing the pen register used in Smith that did not acquire the content of
communications from the listening and recording device used in Katz); see also United States
v. White, 401 U.S. 745,752 (1971) (holding that a government informant's use of a concealed
radio transmitter during conversations with White did not violate the Fourth Amendment
because a criminal assumes the risk that his accomplice is cooperating with law enforcement).
131. Orin S. Kerr, The Case for Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561 (2009)
("Information loses Fourth Amendment protection when it is knowingly revealed to a third
party.").
132. Id. at 580.
133. Id.
134. Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and A Legislator's
Guide to Amending It (hereinafter "A User's Guide") 72 Geo. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1211-
1212 (2004).
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Justice Sotomayor's invitation to reconsider third-party doctrine
was the most disruptive portion of the Court's opinion in Jones."' She
concluded that "Itihe premise that an individual has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third
parties . .. is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great
deal of information about themselves to third parties."'" Furthermore,
Justice Sotomayor stated she "would not assume that all information
voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited purpose
is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment
protection.""' Thus, strict third-party doctrine should not vitiate Fourth
Amendment protection of that location information, as LBS users
disclose their location for the limited purpose of enabling the
functionality of the LBS or sharing their location information with a
bounded audience. Justice Sotomayor's reasoning is particularly
prescient as in the course of participating in modern society, we entrust a
great deal of private information to third parties, particularly over the
Internet.3" Failing to adopt her wisdom and abiding by a strict third-
party doctrine undermines the privacy protections contemplated by the
Founders in drafting the Fourth Amendment.
At the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted in the late 1700s,
the "'home' was a useful proxy for 'what should be protected"' because
peoples' personal and professional lives centered there and it was the
technology of the time.'39 Today, technology enables people and their
things to be mobile. The "deep reservoirs of information . .. collected
by third-party service providers today ... are the modern iteration of
our 'papers and effects.""'4 0 In 2013, it simply no longer makes sense for
the home to define the scope of Fourth Amendment rights.
Recall in Katz, the Court held, "the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places.""'4  As technology increasingly pervades
contemporary life, the Fourth Amendment should be construed to
ensure a consistent level of privacy protection that is apropos in a free
135. United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945,957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("it may
be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.").
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. For example, e-commerce, online banking, email, chat, and Google search.
139. Harper, supra note 129.
140. Jim Harper, Reforming Fourth Amendment Privacy Doctrine, 57 AM. U. L. REV.
1381, 1402 (2008).
141. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
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society.'42 This was precisely the Founders' intent in drafting the Fourth
Amendment. In his dissent in Olmstead v. United States, Justice
Brandeis famously wrote:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure
conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness....
They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions, and their sensations. They
conferred, as against the government, the right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men.43
To ensure that the Fourth Amendment continues to be effective in
protecting peoples' privacy-and to ensure that America stays at the
forefront of technological innovation and social change-the application
of third-party doctrine must be circumscribed to reflect evolving
technological realities.'" Congress attempted to do just this when it
enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. However, as will
be shown, because the ECPA stands on a foundation of shaky law, such
as third-party doctrine, and has not been updated to account for new
technologies like LBS, it fails to afford LBS user location information
adequate privacy protection.
B. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act
When modern communication technologies gained wide adoption
in the early 1980s, Congress became concerned that existing Fourth
Amendment protections left electronic communications vulnerable to
government interception and private disclosure."' Congress enacted the
ECPA to extend "Fourth Amendment-like privacy protections"4 6 to
"then-nascent forms of telecommunications and computer technology
like cellular phones, pagers, and electronic mail.""' The statute imposes
limitations on the ability of third-party service providers "to voluntarily
142. Harper, Kerr Defends the Third-Party Doctrine, supra note 129.
143. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, L. dissenting).
144. Timothy Lee, Why the 'Third Party Doctrine' Undermines Online Privacy
Protections, TECHDIRT (June 20, 2008), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20080530/
2014171272.shtml.
145. Alexander Scolnik, Protections for Electronic Communications: The Stored
Communications Act and the Fourth Amendment, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 349, 372 (2009).
146. Kerr, A User's Guide, supra note 134, at 1212.
147. In Re Application of the United States of America for an Order Pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 2703(d), No. 10-GJ-3793, 2011 WL 5508991 (E.D. Va. Nov. 10, 2011).
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disclose information about their . .. subscribers to the government" and
"on the government's ability to compel providers to disclose information
in their possession about their ... subscribers." 48
Currently, no statute specifically regulates access to user data. 49
User location data collected by LBS is presumably governed by the
ECPA.so The ECPA consists of three titles: Title I, which amended
Title III of the Federal Wiretap Act,"' protects the interception of wire,
oral, or electronic communications while in transit;152 Title II, the Stored
Communications Act ("SCA"), protects electronic communications held
in storage;' 3 and Title III, the Pen Register Statute, prohibits the use of
pen registers or trap and trace devices to intercept the "content" of
electronic communications in transit.5 4 Additionally, an electronic
communication is defined as "any transfer of signs, signals, writing,
images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole
or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or
photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce, but
does not include ... any communication from a tracking device." 5
Each title has a different standard that the government must meet
to compel disclosure of different classes of electronic communications.
These standards are designed to comport with "the amount of privacy an
individual can reasonably expect in communications that fall within each
class.""' In Jones, the majority declared that the Katz reasonable
expectation of privacy test did not displace the trespassory test; and
although he did not rule on the issue, Justice Scalia suggested, "where a
classic trespassory search is not involved ... resort must be had to Katz
148. Kerr, A User's Guide, supra note 134, at 1212-13.
149. Levis, supra note 27, at 204; see also Parker Higgins, Highlighting a Privacy Problem:
Apps Need to Respect User Rights From the Start," ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION
(Mar. 8, 2012) https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/03/highlighting-privacy-problems-apps-
need-respect-user-rights-start ("the California Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003 requires
operators of online services that collect personally identifiable information from California
residents to conspicuously post and comply with a privacy policy.").
150. Levis, supra note 29, at 204.
151. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,42 U.S.C. § 3711 (Jun.19,
1968).
152. Title I of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508,
100 Stat. 1984 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006)).
153. Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508,
100 Stat. 1984 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-12 (2006)).
154. Title III of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.99-508,
100 Stat. 1984 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27 (2006)).
155. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006).
156. Levis, supra note 29, at 205.
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analysis."' The government's potential use of LBS to track individuals
presents precisely this situation in which no physical trespass is involved.
Title I of the ECPA requires that the government obtain a warrant
based on probable cause that the electronic communication to be
intercepted contains evidence of a crime."' The SCA requires only that
the government "offer[] specific and articulable facts showing that there
are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or
electronic communication, or the records or other information sought,
are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation."'" The
Pen Register Statute merely necessitates that the government's
application for a court order contain "a certification ... that the
information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal
investigation." 0 The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
Act ("CALEA") limits the government's ability to obtain information
about a subscriber's physical location "solely pursuant" to the Pen
Register Statute.'6'
Whether and to what degree a LBS user's location data is protected
under the EPCA depends on six classifications. First, whether real-time
LBS location information, such as a user's location broadcasted via
Google Latitude, is an electronic communication "in transit" under Title
I. Second, whether real-time location information is content or non-
content information. Third, once LBS location information is in
"storage," if the LBS is classified as a remote computing service
("RCS") or an electronic communications service ("ECS"). Fourth,
whether the aggregate of a user's historical location information, such as
their Foursquare or Facebook Places check-in history, is content or non-
content information. Fifth, whether a GPS-enabled smartphone used to
access LBS is a "mobile tracking device" as defined under the Pen
Register Statute. And sixth, whether an exception to the ECPA
applies.
However, under third-party doctrine, regardless of whether
information is protected under the ECPA, an individual relinquishes his
reasonable expectation of privacy in information he discloses to the
157. United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 955 (2012).
158. Levis, supra note 29, at 205.
159. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006).
160. 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2) (2006).
161. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2) (2006).
162. Levis, supra note 29, at 211.
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public.' Justice Sotomayor's concurrence indicating the possibility of a
shift in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence away from strict application
of third-party doctrine, however, places a premium on a user's decision
to allow a LBS to broadcast his location publicly or to limit the audience
that can view the user's information.1 " Arguably, an individual user's
LBS privacy settings are the best evidence of his reasonable expectation
of privacy in the information he shares, rather than a blanket rule that
any disclosure to a third party vitiates that reasonable expectation. This
interpretation has already gained favorable acceptance in the Ninth
Circuit when the court in Crispin v. Christian Audigier held that "a
review of plaintiff's privacy settings would definitively settle the
question" of whether the plaintiff should be entitled to a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his Facebook posts."'
1. Protection of LBS User Location Information Under the ECPA
As previously discussed, Title I of the ECPA applies to
communications in transit.'6 Ambient LBS that allow users to broadcast
their location in real-time fall under Title I because this location
information is being transmitted from one user to another continuously
as he or she travels from place to place to place. Google Latitude, for
example, does not store a historical log of user location information;
Google Latitude's privacy policy states: "Google stores only the most
recent automatic update or location selection you manually entered."'
The government therefore must obtain a warrant to legally intercept a
user's real-time LBS location information.'6 Intercepting is defined as
the "aural or other acquisition of the contents of any ... electronic ...
communication through the use of any electronic . . . device." 69
Under the Pen Register Statute, a "tracking device" is defined as
"an electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking of the
movement of a person or object."7 e A smartphone, therefore, is a
163. Id. at 207. See also 18 U.S.C. § 2511( 2 )(g) ("It shall not be unlawful under the SCA
for any person ... to intercept or access an electronic communication made through an
electronic communication system that is configured so that such electronic communication is
readily accessible to the general public.").
164. United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 957 (2012). (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
165. Crispin v. Christian Audigier, 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 991 (9th Cir. 2010).
166. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006).
167. Google Latitude, Privacy, GOOGLE, INC. http://sites.google.com/a/pressatgoogle.
com/latitude/privacy (last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
168. Levis, supra note 29, at 205.
169. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2006).
170. 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b) (2006).
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tracking device. GPS, CSI, Wi-Fi, and user actions that specify location
can be used to track a smartphone user's movement. Ambient social
networking LBS like Google Latitude enable a user to broadcast his or
her location in real-time publicly, to friends of friends, or only to friends.
It is no longer necessary for the government to physically invade
property or maintain visual surveillance to track individuals; they can
remotely track a user's GPS-enabled smartphone or determine a user's
location by intercepting his or her real-time LBS location information.
The CALEA, however, limits the Government's ability to use the Pen
Register Statute to acquire a subscriber's physical location
information."'
Stringent application of third-party doctrine and public exposure
doctrine would cut against the privacy protections afforded LBS user
location information by the Wiretap Act and the CALEA. By using
ambient LBS, a user exposes his location to other users of the app; he
might limit which users may view his location, or he might share it
publicly. However, ambient LBS broadcast a user's location not just
when he is in public outside. Google Maps for Android now enables
users to find out exactly where they are indoors, such as inside a
shopping mall or an airport.17 It provides a detailed floor plan and even
determines which floor the user is on."' Theoretically, the government
could use this technology to pinpoint a target's exact location inside his
home. In Karo, the Supreme Court held that it was a violation of the
Fourth Amendment for the government to track the location of a beeper
inside a home without a warrant.14 Arguably, using LBS to indicate
your location while inside your home and publicly sharing that
information is similar to inviting the general public into your home. But
if a LBS user takes affirmative steps to limit the audience with whom he
shares his location, then surely pinpointing the user's location inside his
home without a warrant should be a violation of the Fourth Amendment
under the Court's rationale in Karo.
a. Protection of LBS User Location Information Under the SCA
Congress enacted the SCA because the Fourth Amendment does
not address a multitude of potential breaches of privacy presented by
171. Levis, supra note 29, at 218-19.
172. A New Frontier for Google Maps: mapping the indoors, GOOGLE, INC. (Nov. 29,
2011) http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/11/new-frontier-for-google-maps-mapping.htmi.
173. Id.
174. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 719 (1984).
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the advent of the modern technology.'7 The SCA limits the ability of
the government to compel service providers to disclose information
about their customers and subscribers, and limits an Internet Service
Providers's ("ISP") right to voluntarily disclose this information to the
government."' The SCA has been described by the Ninth Circuit as "a
complex, often convoluted, area of the law," and because "the SCA was
written prior to the advent of the Internet ... the existing statutory
framework is ill-suited to address modern forms of communication."'77
To fall under the SCA, an electronic communication must be in
storage, where "[e]lectronic storage is defined as any temporary,
intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to
the electronic transmission thereof; and any storage of such
communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of
backup protection of such communication." ' Once it is established that
a communication is in storage, it is necessary to determine if the service
provider is a provider of an electronic communications service ("ECS")
or a remote computing service ("RCS"). An ECS is defined as "any
service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire
or electronic communications."'n A RCS, on the other hand, is defined
as "the provision to the public of computer storage or processing
services by means of an electronic communications system. "'80 A service
provider's classification as an ECS or RCS depends on "the service that
is being provided at a particular time (or as to a particular piece of
electronic communication at a particular time).""' If the service
provider does not fit within either of these categories then only basic
Fourth Amendment protections apply.' Explaining how the SCA has
been applied to electronic communications such as Facebook posts will
help to clarify the difference between an ECS and a RCS.
The Ninth Circuit held in Crispin, that a Facebook post "is not
protectable as a form of temporary, intermediate storage."' 3" The court
said that "there is no temporary, intermediate step for wall postings or
175. Crispin v. Christian Audigier, 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 971 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
176. Id. at 972.
177. Id. (internal citations omitted).
178. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006).
179. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2002).
180. 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2) (2001).
181. Crispin v. Christian Audigier, 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 987 (9th Cir. 2010).
182. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator's Guide to
Amending It, supra note 134, at 1213.
183. Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 989.
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comments" because a Facebook post, unlike email, can be deemed
received without being opened.'4 Once made, Facebook posts and
comments are stored for backup purposes.'5 As a result, Facebook
posts and comments are "in storage," and thus fall within the SCA.
With respect to posts and comments, Facebook is an ECS provider
because it provides users the ability to communicate with their friends.'?
Facebook is also a RCS provider because it stores user-generated
content on its servers for the benefit of the user and the audience he
designates.'? Importantly, the Ninth Circuit stated in dicta that "the
number of users who can view the stored message has no legal
significance."'8
A LBS is classified as an ECS when it is being used as form of
communication between one person and another; one person who wants
to share where they are and the other who wants to find out their
friend's location. A LBS is an RCS when it is being used as a storage
service to enable users to access a history of their whereabouts, and to
enable the application to access historical location information for
business purposes. Like Facebook posts and comments, there is no
temporary, intermediate step for LBS location information. Once a user
broadcasts his location or checks-in, this location information is
immediately accessible to him or other users via the application.
Depending on the application, LBS location information is also in
storage once it resides on the application's servers for either backup or
storage purposes for the benefit of the user and his friends. Thus,
Foursquare and Facebook check-ins are also in storage because a user's
check-in is posted on his or her profile immediately.
Whether a LBS is classified as an ECS or a RCS determines the
standard that the government must meet to compel disclosure of LBS
user location information. The government must obtain a search
warrant to compel an ECS "to disclose contents of communications in its
possession that are in temporary 'electronic storage' for 180 days or
less.""9 To compel disclosure of content that has been in electronic
storage for more than 180 days-including detailed records about the




187. Id. at 990.
188. Id.
189. Kerr, A User's Guide, supra note 134, at 1218.
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warrant, or with prior notice to the subscriber it can obtain a subpoena"
or a court order known colloquially as a "2703(d) order," if it provides
"specific and articulable facts" showing that the content to be compelled
is "relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation."'9 ' To
compel non-content information from either an ECS or RCS, the
government can obtain a search warrant,'9 a 2703(d) order,'9 or do so
with the subscriber's consent.'" With merely a subpoena however, the
government can obtain "basic subscriber information" including name,
address, telephone number, and call records.' A public ECS and RCS
may not voluntarily disclose to the government content or non-content
subscriber information unless it fits within an exception to the ECPA.'96
Content is defined as "any information concerning the substance,
purport, or meaning of that communication."'" Content information is
distinguishable from non-content information as "[c]ontent information
is the communication that a person wishes to share or communicate with
another person.... [N]oncontent information ... is information about
the communication that the network uses to deliver and process the
content information."' On its face, a glimpse of a user's real-time
location from ambient LBS is analogous to seeing someone walking
down the street, and since the information inferred from visual
apprehension is not protected under the Fourth Amendment, it makes
sense that neither is real-time LBS location information. Yet a single
check-in on Foursquare or Facebook actually is content information that
is protected because a user checks-in to share his location with his
friends and some LBS enable users to interact with the check-in by
adding user-generated content such as a comment or review.
Interestingly, Foursquare defines "content" in their terms of use as
including "any location information."'99 And, when real-time location
data is monitored over an extended period of time, or logged and
accessed historically in the aggregate, inferences can be drawn about a
190. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(B) (2009).
191. Kerr, A User's Guide, supra note 134, at 1218 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2009)).
192. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(A) (2009).
193. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(B) (2009).
194. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(C) (2009).
195. Kerr, A User's Guide, supra note 134, at 1219-20 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2)
(2009)).
196. Id. at 1223 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2008)).
197. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2002).
198. Kerr, A User's Guide, supra note 134, at 1228.
199. Terms of Use, Content, FOURSQUARE LABS, INC. (Jan. 29, 2013),
http://Foursquare.com/legal/terms (emphasis added).
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person's activities and associations to reveal an "intimate picture" of his
life.200
Apparent in the discussion supra, the ECPA is overly technical and
difficult to apply. In my opinion, under the SCA, LBS are ECS because
regardless of whether they are later used for storage purposes their
immediate use is as a form of communication. Therefore, to compel
disclosure of LBS user location information in the form of a single
check-in or aggregated historical location information that is less than
180 days old, the government should be forced to obtain a search
warrant. The fact that the government may obtain LBS user content
greater than 180 days old under a lesser standard than probable cause is
particularly problematic because the more location data it can
accumulate, the more accurately it can identify patterns to paint a
detailed picture of a person's life.
IV. Application of the ECPA in Current Case Law on
Electronic Communication Technologies Similar To LBS
To anticipate how real-time and historical LBS user location
information is protected under the ECPA, it should be analogized to
other forms of electronic communication such as cell-site information,
email, and content on social networking sites for which a body of case
law already exists. The cases that follow consider "whether a third-party
service provider's right of access to [electronic] communication
extinguishes the subscriber's reasonable expectation of privacy in the
content of such communications." 20 1
Those cases that hold that a user's reasonable expectation of
privacy in his or her electronic communications is not extinguished by a
third party service provider's right of access distinguish United States v.
Miller and its progeny because modern communications technologies
reveal a great deal more private information than bank records.2' Those
cases that hold that a user does not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his electronic communications argue that users voluntarily
convey this information to their service providers, extinguishing their
200. EPCA Reform: Why Now?, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS COALITION (2010)
http://www.digitaldueprocess.org/index.cfm?objectid=37940370-2551-11DF-8EO2000C296
BA163 (last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
201. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical
Cell-Site Information (hereinafter "In re Application"), 2010 WL 5437209,3 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
202. See United States v. Miller, supra note 128. See also United States v. Warshak, 631
F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010).
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expectation of privacy under third-party doctrine.203 The ECPA's
weakness is reflected in the fact that federal courts lack any sort of
consensus about how the statute applies to modern communications
technologies.
A. Cell Site Location Information
In In re Application of the United States of America for an Order
Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Information, the Eastern
District of New York held that mosaic theory as applied in Maynard was
appropriate to apply to historical cell site information.2 04 A cell phone
user has a reasonable expectation of privacy in her historical cell site
information because she does not "voluntarily expose[] information
about her location," and these records "can effectively convey details
that reveal the most sensitive information about a person's life-
information that goes far beyond the ordinary course of the service
provider's business."20 s Because granting the government access to cell
site information records implicated the Fourth Amendment, the Eastern
District required the government to make a showing of probable cause
to obtain it.206
In In re Application of the United States of America for Historical
Cell Site Data, cell site location data was "sufficient to plot the target's
movements hour by hour for the duration of the 60 day period."2 07
Similar to the Eastern District of New York, the Southern District of
Texas also applied Maynard's rationale that prolonged surveillance
reveals an "intimate picture" of the target's life.2 8 Since a cell phone
user does not "knowingly expose" or "voluntarily convey" his cell site
location information to his service provider in any meaningful way, "the
bare possibility of disclosure by a third party cannot by itself dispel all
expectation of privacy."' The court here held that cell site data is
subject to Fourth Amendment protection and the government may not
obtain it without a warrant based on probable cause.2 o
203. United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384 (D. Md. 2012).
204. In re Application, 2010 WL 5437209, 3.
205. Id. at 2-3.
206. Id. at 4.
207. In re Application of the United States of America for Historical Cell Site Data, 747
F. Supp. 2d 827, 839 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
208. Id. at 835.
209. Id. at 839.
210. Id. at 845.
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Counter to those two cases is United States v. Graham, in which the
District of Maryland held that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred
by granting the government's application for a 2703(d) order for
historical cell site data under the SCA's "specific and articulable facts"
standard.2 11 The court concluded the Fourth Amendment did not
protect historical cell site data because it is not reasonable to hold an
expectation of privacy in it.2 12 Applying a strict interpretation of the
third-party doctrine, the defendants voluntarily conveyed their location
to their cellular provider by using their phones and the historical cell site
data "were business records kept in the ordinary course of business by
the Defendants' cellular provider." 13
United States v. Skinner dealt with the government's use of GPS
data to track a target without engaging in a physical trespass, precisely
the situation raised at the beginning of this note.214 In Skinner, the Sixth
Circuit ruled that the government's use of GPS location information
from a target's cell phone to track its real-time location was not a
violation of the Fourth Amendment because the target did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in that data.215 The court held that
when determining whether a defendant's reasonable expectation of
privacy has been violated, a court should examine the information that
the defendant disclosed to the public, not what information the police
knew."' Distinguishing Jones, the Sixth Circuit said there was no
physical trespass and "no [] extreme comprehensive tracking is present
in this case.""
In her concurring opinion in the judgment only, Judge Donald
engaged in the kind of forward thinking that is necessary to protect LBS
user location information under the Fourth Amendment. Judge Donald
would have found that the tracking was a search within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment because Skinner's expectation of privacy in the
GPS data emanating from his cell phone was reasonable. 218 To Judge
Donald, Skinner's erroneous belief about, or ignorance of, a cell phone's
GPS capabilities and the fact that he most likely did not anticipate that
his phone was trackable shows that he had a subjective expectation of
211. United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384 (D. Md., 2012).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 403.
214. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir., 2012).
215. Id. at 775.
216. Id. at 779.
217. Id. at 780.
218. Id. at 786 (Donald, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
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privacy in his GPS data."' More importantly, the fact that "society is
prepared to recognize a legitimate expectation of privacy in the GPS
data emitted from any cell phone," requires that such information
gathering mandates a warrant.220
Under the rationale of some of these cases, LBS user location
information might not be protected. Although a user's location data in
the aggregate reveals an "intimate picture" of his life, LBS users
"knowingly expose" and "voluntarily convey" their location to the
application, which is analogous to a cellular service provider. In other
words, LBS users know or should know that by using LBS they are they
are disclosing their location information to the LBS, and therefore
consenting to possible compelled disclosure of that data to the
government." Unlike cell phone users who inadvertently reveal their
location by virtue of carrying a cell phone that is turned on, LBS users
intentionally share their location with the application.
But LBS users likely do not expect that by providing their location
information to the application or service, the government can acquire it.
Even if a LBS privacy policy or terms of service states that the company
may disclose user information, it is futile to point to legal fine print and
map a negligence standard onto criminal law to argue that users'
expectations of privacy are not reasonable because these agreements are
very rarely read.222 In other words, if a user did not have actual
knowledge of the privacy policy, it is difficult to argue that they did not
have a subjective expectation of privacy in their LBS location
information. Furthermore, in California, at least, contracts of adhesion
are not enforced if contrary to people's expectations. 2 Unless a user
219. Id. at 784 (Donald, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
220. Id. at 785 (Donald, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
221. Kerr, The Case for Third-Party Doctrine, supra note 129, at 588. See also In Re
Application of the United States of America for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d),
830 F. Supp. 2d. 114 (E.D. Va. Nov. 10, 2011) (holding that Twitter's disclosure of petitioners'
IP address to the government was not a search because petitioners did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their IP address, which was subject to examination by Twitter).
222. In Re Application of the United States of America for an Order Pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 2703(d), 830 F. Supp. 2d. 114 (E.D. Va. Nov. 10, 2011) (holding that petitioners had a
lessened expectation of privacy in their IP address because by creating a Twitter account and
using the service, they agreed to Twitter's privacy policy and "knew or should have known
that their IP address was subject to examination by Twitter").
223. California Civil Code Section 1670.5(a) provides a court with several options: "If the
court as a matter of law finds the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was
made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result." California courts have been at
the vanguard of deeming Internet contract clauses unconscionable, and hence unenforceable.
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shares his location publicly, the fact that he has circumscribed the
audience with whom he shares it is evidence of his subjective
expectation of privacy.
And although checking-in to a coffee shop on Foursquare is not a
necessity in modern life like dialing a phone number or maintaining a
bank account, LBS user location data encompasses so much more than a
Foursquare check-in. We do many things on our smartphones that are
necessary to participate in society: making or taking a call, checking and
sending email, or using Google Maps for directions. Since our location
information can be ascertained from uses like these, some LBS usage
can almost be said to involve involuntary disclosures of our location
information. For these reasons, I believe that a better standard than the
reasonable expectation of privacy test would be whether a person
intends to limit access to his location information in a way that society
recognizes as reasonable. The fact that a person uses LBS in
furtherance of criminal activity should not matter-"numerous courts
have held that privacy expectations are not diminished by the criminality
of a defendant's activities." 4
B. Email
In Rehberg v. Paulk, the Eleventh Circuit stated that by sending an
email to a third party, the sender loses a reasonable expectation of
privacy in it.225 However, in United States v. Warshak, the Sixth Circuit
held that "a subscriber enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
contents of emails that are stored with, or sent or received through, a
See Comb v. Pay Pal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d. 1165 (2002) (holding that a user agreement's
arbitration clause was unconscionable because it was a contract of adhesion; the clause lacked
mutuality, and it had the practical effects of precluding joinder of claims, and allowing
prohibitive arbitration fees.).
224. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772,785 (6th Cir. 2012). (Donald, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment).
225. Rehberg v. Paulk, 598 F.3d 1268,1281-82 opinion vacated and superseded on reh'g,
611 F.3d 828 (11th Cir. 2010) cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1678 (2011). On rehearing, the Eleventh
Circuit cited the Sixth Circuit's decision in Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir.2001)
which "reasoned that a person would lose a legitimate expectation of privacy in a sent email
that had already reached its recipient, analogizing an emailer to a letter-writer, whose
expectation of privacy ordinarily terminates upon delivery of a letter." Rehberg v. Paulk, 611
F.3d at 843-44 (11th Cir. 2010) cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1678 (2011) (internal citations
omitted). However, the Eleventh Circuit declined to rule on the issue of Rehberg's right to
privacy in his emails and decided the case on narrower grounds. See also United States v.
Lifshiftz, 369 F.3d 173, 190 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that "[i]ndividuals ... may not . .. enjoy []
an expectation of privacy in transmissions over the Internet or e-mail that have already
arrived at the recipient."); United States v. Bach, 310 F.3d 1063, 1066 (8th Cir. 2002)
(declining to decide the issue of "whether there is a constitutional expectation of privacy in e-
mail.").
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commercial ISP," notwithstanding the fact that the third party ISP had
access to the emails."' The Sixth Circuit distinguished emails from the
bank records involved in Miller, reasoning that emails potentially
contain "confidential communications," whereas bank records are
"simple business records."" Furthermore, the court pointed out that
the ISP is "not the intended recipient of the emails," whereas the bank
uses bank records "in the ordinary course of business.",2 8 The Sixth
Circuit concluded that the government must obtain a warrant based on
probable cause to compel an ISP to disclose the contents of an email.229
Like email, check-ins and aggregated historical location data are
potentially sensitive in nature. And like email, LBS user location
information is sent, received, and stored by the service provider.
Arguably, a user's friends are the only intended recipients of his or her
location information. Yet Foursquare users earn badges for checking-in,
requiring the application itself to receive and categorize the user's
location. Some users allow LBS to determine their location to receive
personalized recommendations, while many LBS use location
information in the ordinary course of business by mining this data to
provide a better service for users, to iterate on the application, and to
provide user information to advertisers to enable them to serve targeted
ads.2m Under the Sixth Circuit's rationale in Warshak, Fourth
Amendment protection of LBS user location information would not be
extinguished merely because the LBS has access to it.
C. Social Networks
In Crispin, the Ninth Circuit held that a user of a social networking
site has a personal privacy right in information on his or her profile or in
his or her inbox.23 ' The court concluded that a Facebook wall, like
private electronic bulletin board services ("BBS"), is classified as an
ECS under the SCA.232 Given that some Facebook walls are restricted, it
deserved ECS classification, whereas a completely public BBS does not
merit protection under the SCA.m Since Facebook posts are accessible




230. Foursquare Labs, Inc. Privacy Policy, What Personal Information Does Foursquare
Collect?, FOURSQUARE LABS, INC. (Jan. 29, 2013), http://foursquare.com/legal/privacy.
231. Crispin v. Christian Audigier, 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 974 (9th Cir. 2010).
232. Id.; See also Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 875 (9th Cir. 2002).
233. Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 981.
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only to an audience selected by the user, the Facebook wall (now
Timeline) is "not strictly 'public."'2 The case was remanded so that the
parties could "develop a further evidentiary record regarding plaintiff's
privacy settings and the extent of access allowed to his Facebook wall."13
The Ninth Circuit suggested that the plaintiff's privacy settings were
dispositive of his reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of his
wall posts."' If the plaintiff limited access to his Facebook wall, then the
subpoenas should be quashed; if it was accessible to the public, then the
subpoenas should be granted.
Foursquare and Facebook check-ins are most similar to Facebook
posts when their access is restricted to other users who the user selects
rather than publicly available. A check-in on Facebook Places is
literally posted to a user's timeline; therefore, under Crispin, a user has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his check-ins. And a user's
Foursquare history functions similarly to a Facebook timeline in that the
user and his friends may comment on check-ins. Under the rationale of
Crispin, so long as the user restricts access to his location information he
retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in that information, even
though the third party LBS has access to it.
D. Summary
In only a few short years, case law has already considered electronic
communication technologies governed by the ECPA, and most of the
opinions were ultimately decided on the basis of the individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy and the applicability of third-party
doctrine, rather than through parsing the statute. Many of the decisions
made on those bases resulted in unjust holdings that jeopardize our right
to privacy in what we do with our smartphones, while only a few judges
properly felt that electronic communications should receive robust
Fourth Amendment protection. If a LBS user publicly broadcasts his
location or publicly shares his check-ins, then even in the aggregate his
location information is not protected under the Fourth Amendment and
it does not fall under protection of the ECPA. If the user deliberately
makes his location publicly available, he assumes the risk that the
government will obtain this information and use it against him. But as
234. Id. at 980.
235. Id. at 991.
236. Id. ("a review of plaintiffs privacy settings would definitively settle the question").
237. Id. ("Given that the only information in the record implied restricted access, the
court concludes that Judge McDermott's order regarding .. . subpoenas [seeking Facebook
wall postings] was contrary to law.").
users become more aware of and concerned about digital privacy, they
are sharing less publicly.
Even if many LBS users do not mind if an application or the
government can access their location information because they are law-
abiding citizens, we should be concerned as the government's acquisition
and use of this information may have disproportionate effects on
minorities. A recent Pew Internet study found that:
Geosocial services and automatic location-tagging are
most popular with minorities.... Hispanics are the most
active in these two activities, with a quarter (25%) of
latino smartphone owners using geosocial services and
almost a third (31%) of ;atino social media users
enabling automatic location-tagging. However, though
only 7% of white smartphone owners use geosocial
services.3
LBS offer benefits such as "self-expression and socialization."
Human beings' social nature motivates us to use LBS. This desire for
social connection "can trigger systemic biases in the mechanisms that
people use to evaluate privacy risks" and explains why "notwithstanding
its well known privacy risks ... [people] systematically underestimate
those risks."4 This is more evidence for the proposition that
smartphone users likely do hold a subjective expectation of privacy in
their location information emanating, voluntarily or not, from their
phones. Furthermore, as discussed supra, use of LBS is becoming ever
more important to participate fully in today's technologically advanced
society. For millions of Americans, social networking and LBS are fast
approaching the same essential communication role as the telephone
and email.241 It is necessary to reconcile the growing importance of LBS
as a form of modern communication with the fact that LBS user location
information may not receive adequate privacy protection under the
Fourth Amendment or the ECPA. Two bills currently in the Senate
238. Zickuhr & Smith, supra note 19, at 3.
239. Brown, supra note 23, at 307.
240. Id. See also Zickuhr & Smith, supra note 19, at 7 ("Many social media sites,
including social networking sites such as Facebook and the status-updating service Twitter,
enable users to set up the service to automatically post information about their current
location along with their updates on the site. Our survey found that 14% of social media
users take advantage of these services, and have set up their account to automatically include
their location in their posts.").
241. Brown, supra note 23, at 305-306.
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attempt to address this conflict by amending the ECPA and by
establishing stringent privacy protections for geolocation information.
V. Potential ECPA Reform
Simply put, the "ECPA does not clearly state the standard for
governmental access to location information."242 This leaves LBS users
"confused about the security of their data" when the government
requests access and companies are "unable to assure their customers
that subscriber data will be uniformly protected."243 Digital Due Process,
a coalition of privacy advocates, academics, companies, and think tanks
has articulated a clear principle of ECPA reform: "simplify, clarify and
unify the EPCA standards."2 " This requires that the government obtain
a search warrant based on probable cause to compel disclosure of
"communications that are not readily accessible to the public,"
regardless of their age; and "preserv[e] the legal tools necessary for [the
Government] to enforce laws ... and protect the public."2 45
In May 2011, Senator Patrick Leahy introduced S. 1011, the
"Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments of 2011."246
Senator Leahy is pushing for ECPA reform to "protect American's
privacy,... encourage American innovation and instill confidence in
American consumers."'4 Senator Leahy's bill includes provisions
specifically for a "geolocation information service," defined as "the
provision of a global positioning service or other mapping, locational, or
directional information service."2 LBS are a classified as a geolocation
information service provider under the bill.
242. EPCA Reform: Why Now?, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS COALITION (2010)
http://www.digitaldueprocess.org/index.cfm?objectid=37940370-2551-11DF-8EO2000C296
BA163 (last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
243. Id.
244. Our Principles, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS COALITION (2010)
http://www.digitaldueprocess.org/index.cfm?objectid=99629E40-2551-11DF-8EO2000C296
BA163 (last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
245. Id.
246. Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011, S. 1011, 112th
Cong. (2011) available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112slOllis/pdflBILLS-
112slOlis.pdf.
247. David Carle, Leahy Chairs SJC Hearing to Explore Reforms to Digital Privacy Laws,
PATRICK LEAHY FOR UNITED STATES SENATOR FOR VERmONT (Sept. 22, 2010)
http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/press-releases/releasel?id=ce247beO-71ab4fd4-a37d-12d76
5e9726f.
248. Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011, S. 1011, 112th
Cong. (2011).
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The bill also "requires that the government obtain either a search
warrant or a court order under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
to access or use an individual's smartphone or other electronic
communications device to obtain geolocation information." 9
Furthermore, the bill distinguishes between real-time and historical
geolocation information, providing a legal standard for each. The
government must obtain a search warrant to acquire real-time
geolocation information from a service provider, while to obtain
historical geolocation information, either a search warrant or a court
order is sufficient.250 In addition to these reforms, the ACLU of
Northern California suggests that a warrant be required to use cell
phones as tracking devices, and that a suppression remedy be available
for evidence obtained in violation of the ECPA.25'
In June 2011, Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) introduced S. 1212, the
Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance Act ("GPS Act"). The bill
amends the EPCA "to specify the circumstances in which a person may
acquire geolocation information."252 Modeled after the Wiretap Act, the
GPS Act requires that the government obtain a warrant to acquire
geolocation information and provides an exclusionary remedy,
"prohibit[ing] unlawfully intercepted geolocation information from
being used as evidence."253
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Court's excavation of the trespass doctrine in
United States v. Jones and Justice Sotomayor's invitation to reconsider
whether third-party doctrine has a place in the digital age has disrupted
Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence. Yet, by using a property-based
approach to find a Fourth Amendment violation in that case, the Court
sidestepped the larger question of whether the government's prolonged
surveillance of Jones violated his reasonable expectation of privacy.
Taken a step further, deciding this question might have led the Court to
discuss the situation in which the government tracks an individual for an
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Privacy Laws Don't Auto-Update. Demand a Privacy Upgrade., AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA (2012) http://dotrights.org/lawmakers (last
visited Apr. 7, 2013).
252. Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance Act, S. 1212, 112th Cong. (2011) available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112sl2l2is/pdf/BILLS- 12s1212is.pdf.
253. Section-by-Section Summary, Geolocation and Privacy Surveillance ("GPS") Act,
UNITED STATES SENATOR RON WYDEN http://wyden.senate.gov/issues/issue/?id=b29a3450-
f722-4571-96f0-83c8ededc332#sections (last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
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extended period of time without physical trespass. Since the Court did
not decide this question, we are left to parse outdated and overly
technical statutory law and to analogize LBS user location information
to case law about similar electronic communications.
Americans are using LBS more and more to identify themselves
and to reap the benefits of this technology. But LBS user location
information does not fit neatly within existing Fourth Amendment law
or federal statutory law. Consequently, it is unclear whether, and to
what extent, this sensitive information is protected from government
intrusion. Since LBS user location information is precisely the kind of
sensitive information that the Founders sought to protect from
governmental intrusion, courts should accept Justice Sotomayor's
invitation and reconsider the application of not only third-party
doctrine, but also the reasonable expectation of privacy test to electronic
communications like LBS user location information. The ecosystem of
social, local, and mobile applications and services is growing rapidly,
changing markets and driving innovation. It is important that digital
privacy laws neither stifle innovation nor discourage its adoption.
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